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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ADB 
AfDB 
BOO/BOT 
CAS 
CDC 
CDF 
CEM 
DAC 
DFID 
ESAF 
ESW 
FDI 
FIAS 
FY 
GATS 
GDP 
GEF 
HIPC 
IAS 
IBRD 
ICSID 
IDA 
IDB 
IFC 
IFIs 
IMF 
IPPs 
MDG 
MIGA 
NGO 
OECD 
OED 
PRGF 
PRSP 
PSD 
PSIA 
PSP 
SWAP 
TA 
USAID 
UN 
UNDP 
WB 
WBG 
WTO 
Asian Development Bank 
African Development Bank 
Build-Own-Operate/Build-Operate-Transfer 
Country Assistance Strategy 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (DFID) 
Comprehensive Development Framework 
Country Economic Memorandum 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD) 
Department for International Development (UK) 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (IMF programme – now turned into PRGF) 
Economic and Sector Work 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign Investment Advisory Service (IFC) 
Fiscal Year 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 
Gross Domestic Product 
Global Environment Facility 
Highly Indebted Poor Country 
International Accounting Standards Institute 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (WBG) 
International Development Association (WBG) 
Inter-American Development Bank 
International Finance Corporation (WBG) 
International Financial Institutions 
International Monetary Fund 
Independent Power Producers 
Millennium Development Goal 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (WBG) 
Non-Governmental Organization 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Operations Evaluation Department 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (IMF programme) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
Private Sector Development 
Poverty and Social Impact Assessment 
Private Sector Participation 
Sector Wide Approach 
Technical Assistance 
United States Agency for International Development 
United Nations 
United Nations Development Programme 
World Bank 
World Bank Group (IBRD, IDA, IFC, MIGA, ICSID) 
World Trade Organization 
See also Table 4 for overview of multi-donor programs 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Summary 
This report looks at how conditionalities and pressures from aid agencies and development banks force 
developing countries to adopt privatisation policies in public services.  
 
It focuses specifically on the sectors of water, electricity, and healthcare, in six countries: Colombia; El 
Salvador; Indonesia; Mozambique; South Africa; and Sri Lanka. It examines the impact of the requirements 
and policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and other agencies including 
regional development banks, the European Commission (EC) and donor countries. It includes a specific 
examination of the various ways in which the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
supports privatisation in these services. 
 
It concludes that the pressures for privatisation have been strengthened through new structures of ‘globalised 
aid’; that they create serious limitations on independent decision-making by developing countries, and 
generate some strong political responses; and that policies of development banks and donor agencies, 
including DFID, should be reviewed to remove such pressures and ensure that policy-making in developing 
countries is determined by local democratic processes. 
 
1.2. From tied aid to globalised aid: GRIPT 
The ways in which conditionalities are applied are now more complex, because the structure of aid 
programmes has become more complex. Aid policies have moved away from the paradigm of donor 
countries (like the UK) giving loans or grants towards projects, towards greater cooperation between 
countries and international agencies, and the elimination of  ‘tied aid’, under which aid was given on the 
condition that it was spent on purchasing goods and services from companies based in the donor country. 
The UK, through DFID, has played an active and leading role in calling for the end of tied aid, and ended its 
own use of the practice in 2001, although it is still practised by most other donors. 
 
The benefits of these changes are clear: the elimination of donor-centric ‘tied aid’, the avoidance of 
duplication, contradiction or wasteful competition between donors, and the potential for better planning of 
the totality of aid. However, these changes mean that, in assessing the impact of aid programmes and donors 
such as DFID, and the effects on the adoption of privatisation policies, it is no longer sufficient to look at 
project funding alone. The impact of aid and donors is increasingly through their contribution to multilateral 
programmes and policies.  
 
One general effect of this process is to globalise aid, and conditionalities, in two senses:  
 
• Firstly, aid is increasingly channelled by international mechanisms and institutions, tied to general 
policies requiring the sectors to be opened to the international business community. This has the 
effect of moving decision-making to the international level, where the influence of multinational 
companies is at least as strong as it is on national governments. Democratic accountability is also 
weaker, because the connection to elected parliamentary representatives is indirect.  
 
• Secondly, instead of the conditions benefiting companies in one country, such as the UK, the benefit 
is attached to the international private sector as a whole. This is significant in relation to privatisation 
in these sectors: instead of aid requiring that a company based in the donor country is given a 
contract, the globalised form of this conditionality is simply that the water sector should be 
privatised, or that the health service should open up to using private providers. This ‘global tied aid’ 
allows the recipient country to choose any private company – but not to choose to prefer its own 
public sector. The benefit of these requirements is not tied to one country, but it is tied to the 
collective, global, interests of private water companies.  
 
The mechanisms through which these globalised conditionalities work can be categorised into five groups:   
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1.2.1.  (G)lobal policy conditions 
At the centre of these policies are the IMF and the WB. IMF loans are now tied to countries’ poverty 
reduction strategy programmes (PRSPs), which contain commitments to a range of policies, frequently 
including some form of privatisation. PRSPs are subjected to the approval of the IMF and WB boards. This 
policy conditionality has a much wider impact than the traditional ‘contract conditionality’: support is tied to 
policies which change the structure of an entire sector, e.g. by the privatisation or liberalisation of electricity 
systems, rather than just one specific contract, such as building a power station. The WB’s country assistance 
strategies (CASs) function in the same way, as a core set of policy conditions to which other WB aid is 
linked. 
 
1.2.2. (R)einforcement through collective donor action 
At the same time there is a move by donors away from funding specific localised projects in a country, 
towards providing funding which supports a certain set of policies in recipient countries. The PRSP usually 
functions as a common reference point for the policies expected to be followed. This shift from micro to 
macro level takes a number of forms through shifting aid from project support to more general budget and 
policy support, through ‘pooling’ of donor aid from different countries behind common policy conditions, or 
the use of regional aid instruments.  
 
This collective action reinforces the power of the core policy conditions, and the PRSP process becomes 
even more central when all aid is focused around it. Aid is increasingly administered through global 
collectives of developed countries, under the auspices of joint institutions such as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the EU or the IFIs; international bodies – like the EC or 
World Bank – or through ad hoc multi-lateral organisations at global level (such as the Global Water 
Partnership) or at country level (e.g. the donor group in Mozambique). 
 
1.2.3. (I)nstruments which are intrinsically restricted to the private sector 
Some institutions and programmes are so structured that they can only be used to support the private sector, 
without the need for conditions attached to specific items of expenditure. The largest examples of this are the 
WB divisions, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), which are of increasing importance in the WB’s activities. They support only private sector 
development: the IFC can only invest in private sector ventures; MIGA’s insurance is only of use to private 
companies. A plethora of other programmes and institutions have been developed which support 
privatisation policies: for example, Business Partners for Development (BPD) only operates where private 
businesses are involved.   
 
1.2.4. (P)roject conditionality 
The traditional form of conditionality is still used through project funding. The impacts of this can be seen in 
many WB, development bank and donor projects which specify a variety of forms of privatisation and 
private sector involvement as part of project design, or as ‘trigger’ conditions for payments of parts of loans. 
 
1.2.5. (T)rade policies. 
The pursuit of trade policies also acts as a pressure to encourage and sustain privatisation, through both old 
(national) pressure from individual countries on behalf of their companies, and new (global) mechanisms, 
like the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  
 
The rest of this report sets out the ways in which these different categories apply pressure in the selected 
sectors and countries for privatisation in the specified sectors. The summary of the impact that we have 
identified can be seen from the table below. 
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Table 1.  Table: GRIPT – Conditionalities, pressures and privatisation in 6 countries 
 G R I P T 
 Global policy - 
IMF/WB PRSP/ 
CAS conditions1 
Reinforcement–  
PRSP-linked and 
pooled aid 2 
Instruments - 
multi-lateral 
restricted 
instruments3 
Project -
conditional or 
restricted 
projects: 4 
Trade - Trade 
pressures and 
GATS 
(UK/EC/USA) 5 
Colombia   EW WEH WE 
El Salvador E   H WE 
Indonesia E  EW WE WE 
Mozambique WE WE E WE W 
South Africa   EW W WE 
Sri Lanka EW  E WE WE 
E – Electricity, H – Health, W – Water 
 
2. The machinery of privatisation conditions 
2.1. Policy conditionality: the IMF and PRSPs 
The central set of policy conditionalities are those applied by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in 
particular the IMF and World Bank. The IMF and World Bank attempt to coordinate through a division of 
labour (with the IMF focusing on macroeconomic conditions), and often cross-conditionality in the form of a 
demand for completion or maintenance of successful programmes with the other institution.6 
 
Conditionalities were initially developed by the IMF to promote conservative macroeconomic policies to 
ensure the repayment of its loans. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the types of policies imposed 
through conditionality changed, coming to reflect more and more the developing ‘Washington Consensus’ of 
export-oriented development through rapid liberalisation and privatisation.7 Between the 1987-1990 period 
and 1997-99, the proportion of IMF structural conditions that related to privatisation rose from 4% to 16%; 
while the proportion of conditions relating to the IMF’s original remit, the exchange and trade regime, fell 
from 30% to 8%.8  Over the same period both the IMF and the World Bank also increased the strictness of 
the conditions – for example through dividing loans into tranches, and making later disbursements 
conditional on implementation of agreed policies.9 Budhoo Davison, who resigned as senior manager at the 
IMF in 1989 after 12 years’ service, stated:  
 
“President Reagan effectively told us to go out and make the Third World a bastion of free-
wheeling capitalism… Everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of 
mission to have the ‘south’ privatise or die; towards this end we created economic bedlam in 
Latin America and Africa in 1983-88.”10 
 
The IFIs and other donors still experienced difficulties in persuading recipient governments to implement 
policy changes the governments thought inappropriate, ineffective, or politically unsupportable,11 and the use 
of more detailed conditions and the design of stronger incentives (e.g. disbursement through tranches) had 
only limited success.12 The new policy is to streamline conditionality, and encourage ‘country-driven’ policy 
development through PRSPs designed by the recipient government, preferably including participation from 
other stakeholders. 13     
 
However, PRSPs must be approved by the boards of the IMF and World Bank, which encourages 
governments to say what they think the BWIs wish to hear. 14 15 16  The end result is much the same as it was 
with conditions attached to aid:17 funds are only available if the ‘right’ policies are pursued. The IMF 
Executive Board, approving new guidelines in 2002, could agree with confidence that: “properly designed 
conditionality can complement and reinforce national ownership”. 18   
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Table 2.  PRSP and CAS privatisation conditionalities in case study countries 
 PRSP (IMF, WB) CAS (WB) IMF programmes 
Colombia n/a none none 
El Salvador n/a E privatisation none 
Indonesia none E framework for privatisation, N 
cost-reflective tariffs 
E liberalisation, preparation for 
privatisation 
Mozambique W framework and strategy for PSP 
E promote PSP 
W privatisation, tariff increases 
E PSP 
W privatisation, tariff increases,  
E liberalisation 
South Africa n/a none n/a 
Sri Lanka E, W framework for PSP 
E, W tariff increases 
H encourage private hospitals 
E liberalisation,  
E, W PPPs 
W tariff increases 
E tariff increases, liberalisation, PSP 
E – Electricity, H – Health, W – Water, N – non-specific 
 
2.2. The World Bank and private sector development 
PRSPs and CASs are targeted by the World Bank’s Private Sector Development (PSD) strategy19, which is 
centrally concerned with promoting the role of the private sector in infrastructure investment, especially 
water and energy. The WB’s June 2003 review of progress with PSD 20 identifies PRSPs and CASs as key 
areas which will be subject to systematic attempts to prioritise the role of the private sector: “Enhancing 
private sector participation in PRSPs will be a priority item in the World Bank Group’s (WBG) PSD 
agenda”.21 This is to be pursued by vigorous involvement in the internal processes of a country as it develops 
its PRSP, through “working with client countries to help them ensure that the private sector has a strong 
voice in the development of the country's own development strategies, policies and programs, especially 
PRSPs”.22  The PSD Sector Board is working on selected countries with upcoming CASs to “mainstream the 
treatment of investment climate issues in CASs and the Bank's operations”.23  The countries will be selected 
“taking into account both the extent and significance of investment climate problems, and the countries’ 
commitment and readiness to address them”. 
 
This policy is reinforced by a new institutional structure, introduced in May 2003, which created a new vice-
presidency to head the PSD strategy which will “help co-ordinate investment climate related activities across 
the Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), and …help feed WBG input on private sector issues into PRSP and CAS processes.”24 The vice-
president will be the WB’s central point of contact for, and external representative to, the private sector. 
 
2.3. Reinforcing the conditions: coordination by the OECD, EU and donor groups 
The IFIs’ conditionalities are reinforced by other donors and commercial lenders25, who frequently link the 
availability of their funding to a satisfactory current assessment from the IFIs.26 This cross-conditionality 
also applies to debt relief – both through the relatively recent HIPC process and through the much longer-
established “Paris Club” debt rescheduling. The former is based around the IMF’s PRSP process,27 whilst in 
the latter case, creditor nations agreeing debt relief almost invariably attach an “IMF clause” requiring 
stabilisation programmes monitored by the IMF. 28 
 
The impact of PRSPs is further magnified as donors coordinate their policies behind common approaches, 
with the PRSP becoming the common reference point. In effect, donors provide a “united front” to recipients 
so that the proportion of aid available without these conditions is considerably reduced:  
 
“Conditionality is most powerful when collectively imposed. In recent years, individual bilateral 
donors have ceded much of their decision-making power to the IMF, which certifies that the 
macroeconomic management of a country is sound and deserving of support. In addition, 
donors have increased coordination among themselves and increasingly present a united 
position to the recipient countries.”29 
 
This coordination is being developed, partly through greater exchange of information on what countries are 
doing and partly by increasing co-operation at global, regional and country level. Multi-lateral institutions, 
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including the OECD’s Development Advisory Committee (DAC) 30 and the European Union (EU), have 
become key vehicles both in the distribution of financial aid, and in developing common policies.  
 
The OECD’s role is coordination. A meeting in Rome in February 2003 of over 20 multilateral and bilateral 
development organisations and about 50 countries endorsed a series of good practice papers on 
“Harmonisation of Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery” and a declaration on the benefits of 
harmonisation. 31  This coordination has included the welcome objectives of reducing transaction costs for 
recipient countries and reducing tied aid.32 The OECD practice papers do not themselves promote 
privatisation in water, energy, health or other public services, but the vehicle of harmonisation magnifies the 
impact of policies which do.   
 
The EU’s role is as a donor in its own right, and as a coordinator of EU member state donors, which can be 
seen in the case of water. Current EU aid on water is, at over €224m in 2001, larger than that of France and 
the UK combined, and larger than any single EU country contribution except Germany.33 About three-
quarters of that spending –  €168.2m – goes to support ‘water resources policy and administration’: much of 
this may be spent on developing the administrative arrangements conducive to privatisation, especially in the 
light of the policy objectives of the EU Water Initiative (EUWI).  
 
The EUWI34 is an attempt, developed in 2002, to coordinate the aid of EU countries behind policies which 
are strongly focused on facilitating and encouraging the private sector to play a bigger role in water in 
developing countries: “The EU water initiative could work on making the water sector more attractive to the 
private sector”. The central feature of the EUWI is creating the right climate to attract private sector 
participation (PSP), including for example reducing risks for private business: “The EU water initiative could 
work on the development of financing mechanisms for managing risk, which could include the setting up of 
a facility to underwrite key areas of risk.” And the EUWI itself will fund work to promote the right sort of 
demands: “as PRSPs and other investment projects are increasingly demand-led, the EU water initiative 
should seek to promote demand for water via education activities and funding of civil society and private 
service providers…”35 
 
Donor co-ordination at country level is now a growing practice which strengthens conditionalities. One 
country where the impact of this is clearly observable is Mozambique, where donors were described in 1998 
as “a powerful group”36, but by 2003 they had formalised the grouping, under the name of  “G11” in an 
acknowledgement of its power.37 The G11 has agreed to share a single set of conditionalities with the WB, 
based on the country’s PRSP, through adopting a common performance assessment framework. This is 
further reinforced by the EU, whose strategy and programmes, over half of which are for general policy 
support, are also linked to the PRSP.38  This means promoting private sector participation in both water and 
energy: Mozambique’s PRSP specifically promises to “promote the participation of the private sector in the 
field of energy…encouraging the participation of the private sector in the provision of [water and sanitation] 
services; update the legislative framework and strengthen the strategy for involving the private sector in the 
management of water supply and sanitation in urban areas…” The CAS adds to this: “introducing a private 
partner for EdM [the state electricity company].”39  
 
2.4. Instruments restricted to the private sector 
2.4.1. IFC and MIGA 
The IFC is a division of the World Bank, which invests solely in the private sector. As such, IFC loans in 
public services are bound to be restricted to privatised ventures. The IFC has a declared policy of being 
simply in favour of extending the role of the private sector in public services, including healthcare. Its chief 
executive, Peter Woicke, declared in September 1999: “…IFC is … moving aggressively to invest in sectors 
where we believe there is substantial scope for more private sector involvement. This ranges from water and 
transportation investments to healthcare, education, and the environment...”40 The IFC’s investments are 
simple financial investments as a shareholder in private firms - for example in healthcare, usually clinics 
providing various diagnostic and therapeutic services, or hospitals, to private patients. Another section of the 
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World Bank, MIGA, provides investment guarantees to protect mainly against political risk – again, a 
service only for the private sector. 
 
The role of the IFC and MIGA is growing as a proportion of WB activity. In 1980, IFC and MIGA 
accounted for only 3.3% of all WB activity; by 2000, it had increased to 25%. The WB’s private sector 
strategy endorses further growth by these two institutions, and they are moving to more central positions in 
the WB group’s policies. This may be problematic for the IFC: it is expressly prevented in its Articles of 
Agreement from interfering in politics: “The Corporation and its officers shall not interfere in the political 
affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member 
or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions and these 
considerations shall be weighed impartially.” 41   
 
The activities of both the IFC and MIGA have a considerable impact on policies in all three sectors in case 
study countries and many others. The section on Indonesia (page 21)includes an example of MIGA playing 
an extremely one-sided role in support of a private company, Enron, at the expense of Indonesian taxpayers. 
 
Table 3.  IFC and MIGA operations in case study countries 
 IFC MIGA 
Colombia W  
El Salvador E,H*  
Indonesia H E 
Mozambique  E 
South Africa H,H  
Sri Lanka H,E E 
E – Energy, H – Health, W – Water                * regional technical assistance to identify potential projects 
 
 
2.4.2. Programmes supporting privatisation 
A number of global initiatives have been created, mainly but not exclusively through the World Bank, many 
of which seek to facilitate or finance private sector involvement in infrastructure, including water and 
energy. The common theme is facilitating and creating the necessary legal and regulatory environment for 
privatisation and foreign investment, or by financing pilot projects or studies. In effect, it is the bureaucratic 
preparation for privatisation.  
 
The new global bodies share some common characteristics. Firstly, they invariably involve a number of 
partners - usually the World Bank, a number of donor countries, and/or other international agencies such as 
UNDP. Secondly, their operations are removed from the direct channel of accountability of donor 
governments. There has been almost no UK parliamentary discussion of DFID initiatives like the Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), for example. Thirdly, especially for the bodies which are 
investment funds, the operation involves assessments by private fund managers according to the normal 
criteria of financial investors. Even though impact assessments may be provided for, decisions on projects 
appear to lie in the hands of fund managers not with democratic institutions in developing countries.  
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Table 4.  World Bank and multi-donor programs supporting private sector participation42 
  
 
Program ESMAP PPIAF BNWP NTF-PSI GPOBA PIDG BPD EAIF 
Inception 
Date 
1983 1999 2002 2002 2003 2003 1998 2002 
Sector/ 
theme 
Energy Private 
Infrastructure 
Water and Sanitation Private Sector 
and 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure Private Sector 
and 
Infrastructure 
Private 
Sector and 
Infrastructu
-re 
Private Sector 
and 
Infrastructure
Purpose Energy Sector 
Management 
Assistance 
Programme 
promotes the 
role of energy in 
poverty 
reduction and 
economic 
growth in an 
environmentally 
responsible 
manner. 
Public-Private 
Infrastructure 
Advisory 
Facility: 
Helping to 
eliminate 
poverty and 
achieve 
sustainable 
development 
through 
private 
involvement 
in 
infrastructure. 
Bank-Netherlands 
Water Partnership is 
a new program to 
improve delivery of 
water supply and 
sanitation services to 
the poor. 
Norwegian Trust 
Fund for Private 
Sector 
Development 
and 
Infrastructure 
provides grant 
resources for 
activities in the 
private sector 
and in 
infrastructure for 
the World Bank 
Group, including 
IFC. The NTF-
PSI fund 
concentrates on 
the poorest 
countries, and 
half the funds 
are earmarked 
for Africa 
Global 
Partnership 
for Output-
Based Aid 
(GPOBA): will 
assist in the 
development 
and 
documenting 
of pilot OBA 
schemes for 
basic 
infrastructure 
and social 
services in 
developing 
countries. 
Private 
Infrastructure 
Donors Group 
Business 
Partners 
For 
Develop-
ment 
Emerging 
Africa 
Infrastructure 
Fund: initiated 
by the Private 
Infrastructure 
Donors Group 
(PIDG) 
together with 
development 
banks and 
private banks
Founders World Bank,  
UNDP,  
European 
bilateral donors 
(9), Canada 
World Bank, 
European 
bilateral 
donors (1), 
Japan 
World Bank, 
Netherlands 
World Bank, 
Norway 
World Bank, 
UK (DFID) 
UK, Holland, 
Sweden, 
Switzerland 
 Private 
Infrastructure 
Donors Group 
(PIDG) plus 
Deutsche 
Investitions- 
und 
Entwicklungs
gesellschaft 
(DEG), 
Development 
Bank of 
Southern 
Africa 
(DBSA), and 
private banks
Members 
who have 
joined 
since 
inception 
France, Italy, 
Japan, Poland, 
UK, USA (+ 22 
partners) 
France, 
Germany, 
Sweden, 
Norway, 
Switzerland, 
Canada, 
Netherlands, 
UNDP, Asian 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), 
UNESCO Institute for 
Water Education 
(UNESCO-IHE), 
International Water 
and Sanitation Centre 
(IRC), International 
Water Association 
(IWA), Water Supply 
and Sanitation 
Collaborative Council 
(WSSCC), World 
Bank Institute (WBI), 
Water and Sanitation 
Program (WSP), 
Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), Inter-
American 
Development Bank 
(IDB) 
  Multi-donor 
technical 
facility 
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2.4.2.1. BPD - Business Partners for Development 
BPD is a project-based initiative created by the World Bank in 1998 and funded in part by the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). The BPD group is “designed to study, support, and 
promote model examples of partnerships involving business, government, and civil society, working together 
for the development of poor communities around the world and, in Durban, working together in the 
communities of Inanda and Ntuzuma.” 43 
  
Currently there are seven focus areas for BPD - South Africa (Durban), Senegal, Haiti, Bolivia (La Paz), 
Colombia (Cartagena), Argentina (Buenos Aires), and Indonesia (Jakarta). These last four include four of the 
biggest urban water privatisations in the world.  In three out of five BPD ‘clusters’ – natural resources, water, 
and knowledge resources - DFID is the only government development agency partner, amongst private firms 
and NGOs. Vivendi Water together with the World Bank and Water Aid of the United Kingdom are the co-
convenors of the water and sanitation ‘cluster’, including a project in Durban, South Africa. A tri-sector 
partnership was launched in 1998 involving eThekwini Water Services (eTWS), Vivendi Water (a French-
owned multinational company) and Mvula Trust (a service delivery non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
targeted at two areas of Durban – Inanda and Ntzuma.  
 
2.4.2.2. EAIF - Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund 
The Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF) was created in 2002 by DFID. As its name suggests it is a 
fund for financing infrastructure in Africa, by lending to “significant infrastructure companies”:44 its 
provisional name, before its launch as the EAIF, was the ‘Africa Private Infrastructure Financing Facility’.45  
Its initial financing comprises committed equity capital of US$100 million from 4 bilateral donors including 
DFID, US$85 million from three development banks (the Dutch FMO, German DEG and South African 
DBSA); and US$120 million of commercial debt from Standard Bank Group and Barclays. DFID intends to 
put in further capital, to increase the fund to $450m.  
 
The fund itself is privately managed by Emerging Markets Partnership, a Washington DC-based fund 
manager.46  Decisions on projects do not involve the governments of developing countries. By May 2003 it 
had already made its first loan, worth £14m., to a private mobile phone network, and was expected to make 
loans totalling £125m by May 2004.47  
 
A $360,000 feasibility study, funded by PPIAF, is now examining the possibility of creating a similar fund 
for Asia. 48 
 
2.4.2.3. ESMAP - Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme 
Another multilateral programme, the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (ESMAP), is 
concerned with energy.49 It is funded by the World Bank, the UNDP, and 11 bilateral donors, one of which is 
DFID. About half of the funding is given as core funding, which is regarded as important because it is not 
tied to specific projects and is therefore available for flexible use by ESMAP. DFID’s contribution to 
ESMAP is significant: in the three years 1999-2001, DFID contributed $2.3m out of a total funding of 
$17.5m. (13%) – and an even higher proportion of core funding, $2.1m out of $9.8m (21% - second only to 
the World Bank itself). The programme’s business plan for the next three-year period, 2002-2004, is due to 
more than double to a total of $40m.50  
 
ESMAP is partly tied to private sector involvement. It focuses on three strategic areas, one of which is 
“market-oriented energy sector reform” (the others are access to efficient and affordable energy, and 
environmentally sustainable production and use of energy).  This area accounts for about a third of ESMAP’s 
portfolio. In recent years there has been “an intensification of efforts for the implementation of institutional, 
legal and regulatory arrangements for private sector participation – particularly in the electricity and 
upstream oil and gas sectors”.  
 
Surprisingly, the “greatest dollar volume growth has been in energy trade, primarily in electricity”. 
Electricity trading is the phenomenon which was at the centre of the collapse of Enron, it has been associated 
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with the California electricity crisis of 200151 and later blackouts,52 and is not normally identified as a 
priority need for developing countries: rather, promotion of decentralised generation and local self-
sufficiency is being advocated as a solution to the problem of blackouts, even in developed countries.53  
 
ESMAP works closely with the multinational private sector. Its consultative committee was told that  
 
“the signal from international energy firms is that there is a greater need for communication 
between them, the World Bank and the donor community…In the ensuing discussion, the need 
for collaboration between the private sector and the development community on issues of 
investment climate and risk was highlighted…there was consensus that creative mechanisms 
should be contemplated for rules of engagement with the private sector without raising conflict 
of interest issues.” 54    
 
The conflicts of interest referred to here are not elaborated. 
 
2.4.2.4. GPOBA - Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid 
In January 2003, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) and the World 
Bank established the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), a multi-donor trust fund 
administered by the World Bank. GPOBA states that “the core of the OBA approach is the contracting out of 
service delivery to a third party, usually a private firm, where payment of public funds is tied to the actual 
delivery of services.” 55 
 
The main function of GPOBA itself is to provide supporting documentation and promote OBA, specifically 
“to assist in the development of pilot demonstration projects and in documenting output-based aid 
methods”.56 
 
2.4.2.5. NTF-PSI - Norwegian Trust Fund for Private Sector and Infrastructure  
Another new agency is the Norwegian Trust Fund for Private Sector and Infrastructure (NTF-PSI), which 
funds “energy, water, urban development, transport, infrastructure and private sector development activities 
across the [World] Bank and the IFC”. 57  It was set up in 2002 under an agreement which commits Norway 
to financing projects under this heading “over a period of years” 58 - although Norway is a country whose 
water and sanitation, like the majority of its public services, are provided directly by public authorities.   
 
The programme covers water, energy, urban development, and transport and private sector development, 
with two main ‘windows’. 59 The first window concerns ‘investment climate’- “the creation of a sound 
investment climate as a prerequisite for private sector development and market-led growth. The second 
window concerns ‘infrastructure service delivery to the poor’ – which, despite acknowledging some 
problems with the private sector, in its specific headings makes uncompromising reference to the WB’s 
private sector development strategy: “The Bank Group's Private Sector Development Strategy calls for more 
extensive use of private sector solutions in infrastructure - through concession arrangements with private 
companies, private participation in infrastructure projects”. Indeed, $6million out of $7million in the 
programme are pre-allocated to existing projects carried out through the IFC (the WB’s division specialising 
in financing the private sector), which “are in line with the new Private Sector Strategy.”  These projects 
include the WB’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF).  
 
2.4.2.6. PIDG – Private Infrastructure Donors Group 
The World Bank describes The Private Infrastructure Donors Group (PIDG) as “a group of like minded 
donors seeking to increase private sector investment in the infrastructure of developing countries”.60 PIDG is 
a planned multi-donor fund “for the development of financial instruments for private sector participation in 
infrastructure .” In October 2003 its backers included the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.   
 
The fund will work with two mechanisms. The first is DevCo, which will provide the service of developing 
potential infrastructure projects “to the point where they can be offered to private sector companies”: 
implementation of the DevCo projects will always be “by the private sector alone or (commonly) working in 
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partnership with other stakeholders in-country”. DevCo Advisory was created by the World Bank in June 
2003, through an agreement between two parties, the IFC's Private Sector Advisory Service Department 
(PSAS) and DFID, to support IFC's privatisation advisory work. DFID agreed to contribute $10 million over 
three years (FY04-FY06).61  The second is code-named GuarantCo, which will offer partial guarantees on 
bonds issued “by private sector infrastructure service providers and possibly municipalities and/or public 
sector authorities in lower income developing countries”. The WB credits the Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) with the original concept of GuarantCo.62 
 
PIDG was an initiative from DFID, whose head of Infrastructure and Urban Development, John Hodges, 
presented his work “promoting private sector investment in infrastructure projects” to the World Bank in 
2002.  Hodges identified institutional, financial and risk constraints on private sector investment in 
developing countries, and proposed multilateral institutions such as PPIAF and EAIF as the key instruments 
to solve these problems. DevCo and GuarantCo are further such mechanisms, and Hodges saw PIDG as the 
overall framework for funding and supporting these agencies. 63 
 
2.4.2.7. PPIAF - Private Public Infrastructure Advisory Facility   
The Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) is a multi-donor technical assistance facility 
designed to “tackle the enabling environment for PPP in infrastructure”.64 Launched in July 1999, PPIAF 
was developed at the joint initiative of the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom, working closely 
with the World Bank. According to a senior DFID official, “DFID was central to the design and 
establishment of the PPIAF”.65 PPIAF pursues its mission through channelling technical assistance to 
governments in developing countries on strategies and measures to tap the full potential of private 
involvement in infrastructure and identifying, disseminating, and promoting best practices on matters related 
to private involvement in infrastructure in developing countries. 
 
PPIAF provides funding for a wide range of activities related to the reform of water and sewerage and the 
development of public-private partnerships in the sector. These include support for innovative transaction 
design for contracts, leases, and concessions; regulatory strengthening and training; sectoral policy related to 
increasing or deepening the role of the private sector; pro-poor tariff design; and consensus building among 
consumers, investors, policy makers, and other key stakeholders. PPIAF has been instrumental in the 
development of the Output-Based Aid model for water supply services funding the conceptual design of 
OBA pilots and has funded the latest Water Reform Toolkit. From the time of PPIAF's inception through 
fiscal year 2003, water and sanitation activities have represented 23% of PPIAF's portfolio in value terms 
(although many multi-sectoral projects include water and sanitation components). PPIAF has also selectively 
supported the design of policy and public-private contractual mechanisms for improving municipal solid 
waste services in metropolitan areas of more than 500,000 inhabitants.  
 
PPIAF funds activities in the energy sector related to private participation in electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution as well as natural gas transmission and distribution. As with other sectoral 
activities, PPIAF's funds have been used for support in market structure policy formation and regulatory 
strengthening, utility reform, legal and regulatory development, tariff design, pro-poor contract design, and 
consensus building among key stakeholders. Between 1999 and 2003, energy sector activities represented 
18% of PPIAF's portfolio in value terms. 
 
Table 5.  Restrictive programmes in case study countries 
 ESMAP PPIAF GPOBA BPD 
Colombia x x  x 
El Salvador  x   
Indonesia  x  x 
Mozambique x x x  
South Africa x x  x 
Sri Lanka x x   
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2.5. Trade promotion and GATS requests 
The influence of trade interests can be seen both at national level, and, through GATS mechanisms, at global 
level. The trade interests of UK businesses, for example, are represented by the Department of Trade and by 
the Foreign Office, in the case of the UK, for whom UK interests are defined as promoting business 
opportunities for British firms abroad. From this perspective, more private sector participation simply 
increases the opportunities, for financial advisors as well as for contractors, which is sufficient reason for 
promoting PPPs and liberalisation overseas, according to trade minister Mike O'Brien:  
 
“The worldwide interest in Public Private Partnerships presents major opportunities for UK 
financial and legal expertise. UK Trade and Investment can draw upon commercial teams in 
over 200 Embassies and Consulates throughout the world to promote the UK's financial, legal 
and PPP expertise and lobby overseas decision makers on liberalisation issues. I am grateful 
to the Corporation of London, the Law Society, the Bar Council and DCA for the training 
provided to overseas staff, helping them understand your needs and to raise the City's profile 
across the globe”.66  
 
In November 2003, in a good illustration of this kind of service, the UK ambassador to Indonesia asked the 
country’s president to put pressure on Jakarta city council to allow Thames Water to increase water prices by 
20%, or else they would leave the country.67 
 
The GATS mechanisms are also being used to put pressure on countries for liberalisation in these sectors, 
specifically through the European Commission’s requests to 109 countries in February 2003. 68  As shown in 
the table, these requests were sent to all six case study countries, requesting all of them to open their 
environmental services (including water), and four of them to open their energy sectors. 
 
Table 6.  EC requests under GATS in case study countries 
 Environmental 
services 
(inc water) 
Energy 
   
Colombia X X 
El Salvador X X 
Indonesia X X 
Mozambique X  
South Africa X X 
Sri Lanka X  
Source: WDM http://www.wdm.org.uk/cambriefs/  
 
3. The role of DFID   
3.1. DFID in an international context 
Evaluating the extent to which DFID is promoting 
privatisation in water, energy and healthcare involves 
looking at its support for policy conditionalities and the 
development of international instruments to promote and 
sustain the private sector in these sectors, as well as 
projects. DFID has untied UK aid from April 2001, and 
plays a key role in promoting and supporting multilateral 
efforts, via the OECD’s DAC, for the untying of aid69, so 
there is little remaining sign of traditional aid 
conditionalities linked to the use of a UK firm. 
 
The importance of international cooperation is visible in DFID 
policies and aid programmes: as Table 7 shows, between 40% 
and 50% of UK aid goes to international programmes (compared with just 26% of the USA’s aid).70  
DFID estimated spending by category, 
2002/3
40%
47%
9%
4%
Country/Regional
Programmes
International
Programmes
Policy Programmes
Other Programmes
Source: DFID (2003), Departmental Report 2003,  Annex 1 p.126
of which 60% goes to EU development funds, 23% to IFIs
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Table 7.  DFID spending by category 2002/3 
 2002/03 
(est), £m  
Notes 
   
Country/Regional Programmes 1335.6 of which Africa: 654.7    of which Asia: 443.3 
Policy Programmes 289.3  
International Programmes 1555.1 of which EU: 928.3     of which IFI: 351.3 
Other Programmes 120.9 of which Private Sector Initiative/CDC, evaluation *: 27.1  
TOTAL–All Programmes 3300.8  
* Includes a number of Funds and projects designed to promote Private Sector participation in development. 
Source: DFID (2003), Departmental Report 2003, Annex 1 p.126 
 
3.2. Reinforcing policy conditionality 
Fifteen percent of DFID’s country aid programme is now in the form of “budget support”. The trend away 
from specific projects towards this more general “budget support” increases conditionalities which relate to 
the broad power of donors to influence or even control recipient governments’ policies. A DFID-funded 
study analysed this as a bargaining relationship which trades money for policy influence: “In supporting the 
budget, donors are lending their loyalty to the government’s entire policy programme. In exchange for 
loyalty, donors are granted a formal ‘voice’ in policy dialogue, debate and influence, donors needed a more 
thorough assessment of the political economy, of the systems of governance, of donor co-ordination and of 
the ability to influence government policy.”71  
 
This approach is being applied in Mozambique, where DFID states that: “Policy conditionality is non-
specific, requiring Government to implement its own poverty reduction programme” – i.e. all aid is subject 
to the global conditions of the PRSP.72  DFID is one of the largest donors in Mozambique73, and a member of 
the G11 group of donors.74 Through the G11, and its commitment to the conditions of the PRSP (or PARPA), 
Mozambique’s national development and poverty reduction strategy, DFID’s aid shares the same 
conditionalities, including promoting the continuation of privatised water. Additionally, DFID’s aid is 
covered by the G11 agreement to use the same assessment criteria as the WB, which currently include part-
privatisation of the electricity system (see section 4.4).   
 
Outside the six case study countries, the impact of DFID’s policy conditionalities can be clearly seen in 
DFID’s £342m programme75 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, where privatisation of electricity has 
been a central policy, financed under WB conditionalities from 1997. DFID’s 2001 review concluded that  
 
“DFID will continue to work closely with the World Bank’s Economic Reform and Power Sector 
Restructuring programmes to support the government refocus its spending priorities and to 
divest functions and services where this is more appropriate. Specifically we will support efforts 
to strengthen the government of AP’s capacity to manage the privatisation programme 
effectively and responsibly; strengthen revenue administration and increase the tax take 
through the successful introduction of Value Added Tax; and improve quality and access to 
power supply through the successful privatisation and regulation of the sector”.76   
 
The review does not mention that there has been bitter opposition to the privatisation programme, including a 
demonstration in August 2000 in which three people were killed.77  
 
3.3. Instruments for privatisation    
One way in which DFID has actively been advancing the cause of privatisation has been through initiating 
and supporting a series of international initiatives aimed at advancing private sector participation in public 
services. Many of these are organised through the World Bank. The design of these instruments often means 
that they are only available to support private sector developments, and so in effect have built-in 
conditionality.  The range of these initiatives is shown in the table below, and in more detail in section 2.4.  
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DFID has not merely participated in, but has been a key initiator, funder, or partner, of many of these 
initiatives, and is duly acknowledged for this.  DFID is playing a far more central role than other donors in 
the creation of these privatisation support mechanisms.  
Table 8.  DFID role in multi-lateral instruments supporting privatisation 
Initiative Acrony
m 
Start 
Date 
DFID  
funded 
DFID 
initiative 
or lead  
Case study countries 
involved 
Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban 
Environment 
PPPUE 1996 Y Y None 
Business/building Partners for 
Development 
BPD 1998 Y Y South Africa, Colombia, 
Indonesia 
Private Public Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility 
PPIAF 1999 Y Y Colombia, El Salvador, 
Indonesia, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund:  EAIF 2002 Y Y no data 
Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid GPOBA 2003 Y Y Mozambique 
Private Infrastructure Donors Group 
/DevCo/GuarantCo – 
PIDG 2003 Y Y no data 
Energy Sector Management Assistance 
Programme 
ESMAP 1983 Y  Colombia, Mozambique, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka 
Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership BNWP 2000   no data 
Norwegian Trust Fund for Private Sector 
and Infrastructure 
NTF-PSI 2002   no data 
 
 
3.4. DFID project funding in the six case study countries 
Current DFID aid to the six case study countries through country programmes is limited. DFID no longer has 
country programmes anywhere in Latin America, and no current country programmes for Indonesia or Sri 
Lanka – although some regional programmes will impinge on these countries – and so the only aid identified 
under the heading of country assistance is for Mozambique and South Africa.  
 
The AiDA78 database of development activities shows DFID’s activities to have been significant in some 
sectors in these countries over the last 15 years or more, but gives no information on any conditionality 
attached. DFID has in the past spent large sums of money in Indonesia, much of it, in the 1980s and early 
1990s, for the electricity sector, during a period when a number of British companies started private 
electricity projects under agreements with the late President Suharto. 
 
DFID aid in Mozambique is all subject to the PRSP conditionalities described above. In addition, a DFID 
water project in Niassa province required the use of private firms to develop its water supply. The province 
however was so poor that there was no viable private sector: just 15 struggling construction contractors and 
one state-owned works company, while the water policy prohibited the direct employment by donors of local 
labour. The result was poor quality work, lack of input and control by communities, with supply points built 
near water sources for the convenience of contractors rather than near villages for the convenience of 
communities. 79 
Table 9.  DFID expenditure by country: 2002-2003, and mid-1980s to 2003 
 DFID country 
budget 2002-3 
(est), £m 
DFID bilateral spending under key headings, mid-1980s to 2003. £m (no of projects)80 
 
  Water Energy Health Government 
Administration 
Programme 
Aid 
Colombia 0 1.2 (4) 3.4 (  1) 0.2 (  5) 0.1 (  3) 0 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0.9 (  5) 0 0 
Indonesia 0 2.3 (5) 112.8 (39) 0.8 (10) 20.0 (11) 0.1 (  1) 
Mozambique 28.0 0.8 (2) 0.6 (  5) 31.1 (21) 13.1 (18) 115.2(17) 
South Africa 39.7 6.3 (7) 0 40.6 (43) 79.0 (56) 0.1 (  1) 
Sri Lanka 0 0.3 (1) 30.9 (10) 10.4 (12) 2.7 (  9) 0 
Totals 67.7 10.8 (19) 147.7 (55) 84.0 (96) 115.9 (97) 115.4 (19) 
Source: AiDA database, www.developmentgateway.org  
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4. Case studies in six Countries 
 
Country GDP/capita 
(US$) 
Population 
(millions) 
Life 
expectancy 
(years) 
Infant 
mortality 
(deaths per 
1000 live 
births) 
Access to 
an 
improved 
water 
source 
Electricity 
use per 
capita  
(kWh) 
Location 
Colombia 1830 43.7 71.8 19.0 91% 845.1 South America 
El Salvador 2080 6.5 70.1 33.0 77% 559.4  Central America 
Indonesia 710 211.7 66.7 33.0 78% 324.9  South East Asia 
Mozambique 200 18.4 41.0 126 57% 54.1  Sub-Saharan Africa 
South Africa 2600 43.6 46.0 65.0 86% 3831.9  Sub-Saharan Africa 
Sri Lanka 840 19.0 73.8 17.0 70% 255.0  South Asia 
Source: World Bank database; figures most recent available – usually 2002 
 
4.1. Colombia 
Colombia’s ongoing public sector reform programme dates back to around 1989-1990. Since then, there has 
been substantial privatisation of the electricity sector, substantial private involvement in water supply, and a 
restructuring of the health system on an insurance basis. All of these reforms have had significant 
involvement in their design and financing by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
in particular, and in the case of water the World Bank has used an unofficial conditionality (not laid out in 
the relevant project documents) to demand (and get) privatisation in the city of Cartagena. International 
Financial Institutions have also provided broad financial support in the form of adjustment loans, as well as 
much encouragement, technical assistance and intellectual support. This includes general financial and 
technical assistance support for implementing reforms,81 with aims such as  
 
“promot[ing] private participation and competition by addressing specific issues and removing 
constraints. The privatisation component will identify and develop projects for potential private 
participation, structure deals, design model bidding documents and implement demonstration 
projects in priority sectors; develop models to make bidding procedures efficient and transparent; 
help develop institutional capacity within sector agencies to structure projects suitable for private 
participation…”82 
 
In the World Bank’s latest Country Assistance Strategy for Colombia (2003), the section on 
infrastructure is headed “Infrastructure - Making Private Participation Work for All”, in view of which 
the declaration that “the policy challenge is how to make private infrastructure investment more 
appealing in the context of the conflict” is hardly surprising. 
 
The water sector has perhaps felt the greatest external impact, with the World Bank pivotal in the Cartagena 
privatisation case (see illustration below), encouraging private sector involvement in Bogotá,83 and funding a 
recent project to involve the private sector in water in a number of coastal Colombian cities.84 In particular, 
the World Bank used the prospect of more Bank funds for water infrastructure to force private sector 
involvement in a project85 which originally had no terms of reference for doing so: 
 
“…the project team pushed hard for the creation of ACUACAR, a mixed capital enterprise, 
during the latter half of the previous Bank project, by leveraging the prospect of additional Bank 
financing for Cartagena's WSS sector ... Institutional reforms have therefore been front-loaded, 
i.e. the reform was a pre-condition for this project, which supports a major environmental 
infrastructure investment.”86 
 
The Bank writes of this case, contradictorily, that “borrower commitment is high as evidenced by the 
privatisation reform process initiated by the District of Cartagena”, even though it has just described the 
leading, even “pivotal”, role of the Bank itself! Moreover, the Bank even notes that “in part, the District 
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moved on PSP because it was convinced that it was the key to continued donor involvement in Cartagena's 
WSS sector,” which was necessary because “the Bank's involvement would provide much needed long term 
financing which is not easily available in local capital markets…”87  
 
The power sector has also undergone a major transformation - from almost 100% public ownership in 1990 
to around 60% private participation in electricity generation (measured in megawatts installed) and over 43% 
participation in supply to final consumers. The World Bank describes Colombia as “a pioneer in introducing 
structural and regulatory reforms in the [power] sector”, with the reforms using a wholesale electricity 
market based on the British model (supported by a $250m World Bank project88). The whole process was 
supported by a World Bank project which designed and implemented the necessary regulatory and legal 
reforms, and began the privatisation process,89 supplemented by $350m of IDB financial support90 with the 
same aim. ISAGEN, the major generator still in state hands, as well as 20 smaller distribution companies 
together serving 45% of users, are in the process of being privatised. There have been delays due to legal 
issues and attacks on infrastructure by rebel groups; the IMF has “encouraged [the authorities] to press ahead 
with the privatisation program despite recent delays…”91 
 
The 1993 health sector reforms separated provision from funding, with people paying for health insurance 
according to their means, and the poor subsidised by government and a portion of the premium from the non-
poor. The reforms were supported by a $38m loan in 1995 from the IDB.92 (In 1999 the IDB’s Multilateral 
Investment Fund’s (MIF) also provided a $0.63m technical assistance project specifically “to encourage 
private enterprise to become involved in managing health care delivery under the subsidised health plans.”93) 
According to the WHO, there has been a substantial improvement in coverage, and the reforms are assessed 
positively.94 However, the WHO’s methodology has been criticised, and the sector is in a financial crisis 
partly caused by the reforms. The number of private insurers has exploded (with attendant inefficiencies and 
high administrative costs), and the state ISS been burdened with the poorer and sicker patients, and with the 
more expensive health services that private insurers do not cover.95 Insurers and municipalities have also run 
up payment arrears with providers, resulting in hospitals becoming indebted, endangering service provision 
to low-income groups, as well as immunisation programmes.96 In 2003 the ISS, in the process of being 
restructured, was in such financial difficulties that it had to obtain a $400m loan from the IDB.97 
 
4.1.1. Colombia: Cartagena’s water 
Washington knows best 
In the early 1990s, Cartagena’s water utility, the municipal-owned Empresa de Servicios Públicos Distritales 
de Cartagena (EPD), was in some difficulties. It failed even to cover its operating costs, and was subject to 
political interference in its investment decisions. A proposal by Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar) led to 
negotiations with then-Mayor Gabriel Garcia Romero. Agbar was the only bidder, and the contract was 
signed on 30 December 1994 – the day the Mayor left office. The incoming Mayor, Guillermo Paniza, had 
actively campaigned against the privatisation and intended to annul the contract and maintain municipal 
ownership and control.  
 
It was at this point that the World Bank stepped in, “leveraging the prospect of additional Bank financing for 
Cartagena's WSS sector”98 to make Cartagena’s democratically-elected Mayor an offer he couldn’t refuse: 
“… during a four-hour discussion in Washington, Menahem Libhaber, the World Bank project manager, 
made it clear to Paniza that PSP involvement was a pre-condition for future Bank funding for the water and 
sanitation sector in Cartagena.”99  The result was that Paniza returned to Cartagena and renegotiated the 
terms of the contract with Agbar. As the World Bank succinctly put it in the project documentation for the 
new $85m loan it subsequently provided: “Institutional reforms have therefore been front-loaded, i.e., the 
reform was a pre-condition for this project, which supports a major environmental infrastructure 
investment.”100 There was more to it than that, though. The Bank’s assessment of its own role notes: “The 
Bank's role in the process of privatisation of the water and sewerage services in Cartagena and in the creation 
of ACUACAR has been pivotal. The Bank has helped attract private sector participation in Cartagena and 
played a crucial role in ensuring the success of the privatisation by promoting ideas, providing a framework 
for considering different PSP options, extending technical assistance, convincing the political decision 
makers to support worthwhile institutional changes, acting as an important catalyst to accelerate process 
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implementation and serving as a mediator in the negotiations. The Bank provided and continues to provide 
stability to the ACUACAR contract, which still operates in a volatile environment, by protecting it from 
political risks at the local and national levels.” 101 
 
The Bank writes of this case, contradictorily, that “borrower commitment is high as evidenced by the 
privatisation reform process initiated by the District of Cartagena”, even though it has just described the 
leading, even “pivotal” role of the Bank itself! Moreover, the Bank even notes that “in part, the District 
moved on PSP because it was convinced that it was the key to continued donor involvement in Cartagena's 
WSS sector,” which was necessary because “the Bank's involvement would provide much needed long term 
financing which is not easily available in local capital markets…”102 
 
For the World Bank, the outcome was positive, as the privatisation in Cartagena was the first case of private 
sector participation in a water company in Colombia,  which “paved the way to the following cases”. 103  By 
September 2001, as the World Bank’s $40m Water Sector Reform Assistance Project104 was being launched, 
50 utilities (14 of them covering 30,000 inhabitants or more) had adopted PSP in Colombia.105 The 2001 
project expected to support PSP in a further 35 municipalities. 
 
Acuacar 
Back in Cartagena, Paniza’s early 1995 renegotiation had raised the municipality’s holding from 10% to 
50% in an attempt to maintain municipal control; but Cartagena’s inexperience with PPPs, especially 
compared to Agbar (founded 1868), still showed in the contract finally concluded. “Under the terms of its 
1995 contract with ACUACAR, AGBAR is only responsible for the management of the system. However, in 
1998 it was awarded a separate contract by the municipality to manage a major investment programme that is 
mainly financed by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank [providing $85m and $24m 
loans respectively]. Consequently, under this complex arrangement the private sector partner will carry out 
the functions normally found in a French-style concession contract, but with protection from the financial 
risks inherent in such an arrangement.” 106  
 
Most pertinently, this meant that Aguas de Barcelona was remunerated both through the dividends paid to 
shareholders and through the management fees, calculated as a percentage of Acuacar's gross income. This 
arrangement has allowed Aguas de Barcelona to extract increasing revenues from its Cartagena operations, 
with management fees rising from 2.94% of gross income in 1995 to 4.25% in 1999. In 1999 Acuacar 
declared profits of $1.96m, whilst Agbar took home $2.1m through dividends and fees,107 aided by the fact 
that the contract stipulates that 50% of net income will be declared as dividend to shareholders.108 The 
contract also saw the municipality take responsibility for $8m a year of pension obligations to retired water 
utility staff. 109 Unsurprisingly, Agbar’s involvement saw the number of employees drop dramatically, from 
510 in 1995 to 262 in 2000. Around 140 took voluntary retirement (presumably adding to the municipality’s 
pension burden); for the rest, Agbar took a more confrontational approach: “On the day that the contract was 
signed with ACUACAR (25 June 1995) all EPD staff were made redundant and invited to reapply for their 
former jobs. All EPD worksites were occupied by police and military forces. Employees working on the road 
with company vehicles were stopped and ordered to surrender their vehicles and equipment. Three people 
were arrested and workers were beaten by the police. Such was the level of violence that the incoming 
management team of ACUACAR needed military protection in order to enter their new offices.” 110  
Following protests, around 270 employees were rehired, although it is reported that the company 
discriminated against known trade union activists. According to Acuacar’s own figures, its subsequent 
performance is impressive, with water coverage increasing from 73% in 1995 to over 90% in 1999, and 
sanitation from 55% to 75%. Yet in 1999, according to the World Bank, “Nearly one-third of the population, 
mostly in poor neighborhoods, is without running water and basic sanitation services”.111 Nickson (2001) 
explains that “… the improvements in coverage publicised by ACUACAR are based on a gross 
underestimation of the target population because they ignore those citizens who reside outside the legally-
defined ‘urbanised’ area of the municipality. And most of these do not currently have access to water and 
sanitation.” 112 
 
Naturally, this restricted definition of what constitutes the urban population has a major effect on coverage 
targets, and exaggerates the significance of the network extension that has taken place. Finally, it must be 
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pointed out that, given the scale of external investment ($157.7m113), it would be truly shocking if no 
improvements had been delivered in Cartagena.  
 
4.2. El Salvador 
The World Bank imposed electricity privatisation as a conditionality in the 1997 El Salvador Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS). This CAS included (under the heading “Increase efficiency and service quality 
through privatisation of infrastructure”) the benchmark:  
 
“Approve legal framework for privatisation, develop and adopt regulatory frameworks for 
telecoms and power, restructure power and telecoms companies for privatisation, and 
privatise.” 114   
 
The 2001 CAS lists the legal framework for privatisation as delivered in Financial Year 1997, and notes that  
“Progress indicators of compliance with the previous CAS benchmarks are mostly satisfactory…”115 Prior to 
the 1997 conditionality, the World Bank had paved the way by funding two related projects: a 1995 Energy 
Sector Modernisation Project, which included a component that supported legal and regulatory reform 
specifically aimed at “displacement of the state in business that can be provided by the private sector”116 and 
a 1996 Public Sector Modernisation Technical Assistance Project, funded with $24m from the World Bank 
and $19.7m from the IDB. This project had as one of its three principal aims:  
 
“Privatisation and Private Sector Participation in the Provision of Public Services: The project 
will assist the government in establishing new rules and institutional arrangements for the 
provision of public services, through privatisation and the development of new forms of 
private sector participation in the delivery of public services, especially in the areas of 
telecommunications, power distribution, water and sewerage, and reform of the country’s 
social security system.”117 
 
The IFC provided financial support for the reforms: “To support improvement of the legal, institutional and 
regulatory framework and promote private investment in the power sector, the IFC approved a US$120 
million investment in the Salvadoran distribution networks.” 118 Meanwhile, the IMF provided general 
encouragement to electricity privatisation in 1998: “[The IMF’s] Directors welcomed the resumption of 
privatisation of public utilities … [including] the sale of the electricity distribution companies…”119 , 
encouragement that was repeated in 2003: “Directors encouraged the authorities to press ahead with their 
reform plans aimed at increasing private sector participation in the economy, including full privatisation of 
the electricity company and the sale of concessions in the transportation sector.”120 
 
In 1998 the IDB provided a $43.7m loan to El Salvador to support a “Reform Program for the Water Sector 
and the Potable Water and Sanitation Subsector”.121 The project included “promotion of … private sector 
participation (PSP) using specialised consultants to give support and financial advice to the government 
towards the effective organisation of PSP schemes.” One of the conditions of the loan (in addition to the 
setting up of the regulatory authority) was the publication of tenders for private sector involvement in 
water.122 As of January 2004, this has yet to happen, although there are indications that the process is 
ongoing.123 
 
This planned water sector reform follows on from a $70m 1997 loan the IDB had provided in support of a 
“Public Sector Modernisation Program”124. The sector reform component of the programme included  
 
“support [for] the government's efforts to implement sector reforms (in electric power, 
telecommunications and transportation) for greater participation by the private sector in the 
delivery of public services. The specific measures will be designed to (i) put into effect the 
regulatory framework for the electric power sector, privatise the electricity distributors, and 
restructure the Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa [Executive Committee of the 
Lempa River Hydroelectric Company] (CEL) into independent generation and transmission units 
to enable the electric power sector to operate competitively…” 
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See also the IDB’s involvement in the health sector in El Salvador below. The World Bank’s IFC arm has 
been supportive of that process: “IFC will support health initiatives from the private sector through direct 
investments and technical assistance. … IFC recently completed a regional technical assistance project to 
evaluate the climate for health sector investments and to identify potential projects with the private sector.”125  
 
4.2.1. El Salvador: Inter-Americas Development Bank tries to force healthcare privatisation 
 
In 1998 the Inter-Americas Development Bank (IDB) agreed a $20.7m loan for a “Project To Support 
Modernisation Of The Ministry Of Public Health And Social Assistance”.126  
 
The project had two elements. The first introduced private contracting and commercial disciplines into public 
hospitals: “The project finances the provision of a package of basic health services for the poor, unserved 
and underserved population in San Miguel and Santa Ana by contracting providers from both the public and 
private sectors on results-oriented contracts. In addition, two public hospitals will be transformed into model 
facilities that are governed semi-autonomously and employ modern management tools…”127  
 
The second element concerns the reorganisation of the entire health system, including “reorganisation and 
decentralisation of national health programs and the financial management system… and implementation of 
monitoring and evaluation capacity.” The implications are unclear, but the project description notes that “this 
project lays the foundation for future sectoral reform.”128 The project was set in the framework of the IDB’s 
country strategy, which includes specific privatisation aims: “….(c) enabling private investment and 
promoting key activities; and (d) modernizing the State, including privatisation and private investment in 
infrastructure.” Given this, along with the IDB’s involvement in health privatisation in Colombia, the project 
is easily interpreted as intending to lay the groundwork for a similar privatisation. 
 
The IDB states that one of the ‘risks’ to the project is that the Government or people of El Salvador may 
prove unsympathetic to the IDB’s policy:  “The March 1999 elections may result in changes in the 
Government's project team that could delay project implementation …Election campaigning has already 
begun and this may lead to greater volatility in policy-making and implementation which could result in the 
introduction of policies that conflict with or contradict project activities.”  The proposals for dealing with this 
include an IDB public propaganda campaign: “…an external strategy for the general population to 
consolidate support for project objectives.” No doubt this thinking is behind the IDB making funds for 
medical equipment conditional on the restructuring taking place: “Investments in medical equipment for 
hospitals financed during the execution of the project will be tied to the prior implementation of management 
reforms and improvements in financial, administrative and clinical systems.”129 
 
The project was bitterly opposed in El Salvador.130  Health workers led a campaign against it, and journalists 
denounced the bill that was put in front of the Salvadorian Congress, saying that it would restrict access to 
information on the proposed new health care system. The bill was rejected by the National Assembly 
(parliament), which then passed a decree prohibiting the privatisation of healthcare. This was vetoed by the 
president, provoking a massive strike and demonstration in October 2002.131  
 
In June 2003 the president finally reached an agreement with the unions which ended the strikes, reinstating 
the workers and withdrawing the privatisation plans.132 According to PSI, the IDB had already decided to 
withdraw the loan proposal altogether: “An IDB official told PSI that "political problems" led the Bank to 
retreat from the privatisation measure.” 133  Without the privatisation reforms no money would be lent for 
healthcare. The project is no longer listed as current by the IDB. 
 
Similar IDB privatisation projects in energy and water in El Salvador have been abandoned or delayed.  A 
1994 project on telecoms and energy was intended:  “….to create a favorable climate for private investment 
in these sectors. It will also establish regulatory commissions for these sectors and promote private sector 
participation in investment programs for these sectors.” The project was cancelled at some unknown date. 134 
In 1998, at the same time as the health project was set up, a water project was approved to “provide support 
for the establishment of the regulatory framework governing provision of water and sanitation services and 
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aid in the restructuring process, promoting private sector participation”. According to the IDB, it has not yet 
been implemented.135  
 
A left opposition party won many votes at the March 2003 congressional elections, and is now expected to 
win the presidential elections in March 2004, partly because of the popularity of its opposition to the health 
privatisation plans.136  There is no comment from the IDB on this, but the USA views the prospect as a 
failure: “it is his [opposition FMLN presidential candidate Shafik Handal’s] plans for change that have 
caused worry here and in Washington - to reverse many of the free-market initiatives the ruling conservative 
ARENA party put in place, to reconsider the privatisations of public companies.” 137  The USA trade 
representative was quoted as saying, “sound policies have produced results," but admitting that "many 
Salvadorans still struggle to overcome poverty.” 138 
 
The IDB’s ‘risk’ scenario is now taking place, with democratic politics preventing their policy from being 
implemented. For the people of El Salvador, the political process of deciding a policy on health care reform 
has involved partly an indirect dialogue with an institution which treats political resistance as a reason for 
either engaging in propaganda or withdrawing its loan altogether. 
 
 
4.3. Indonesia 
 
Major donors + UK: aid for Indonesian water/electricity sector, 1980-1999 (% of aid received by the sector in Indonesia) 
 World Bank ADB Japan UK 
Electricity $3,415m (40%) $1,723m (20%) $2,465m (29%) $51m (0.5%) 
Water $2,313m (34%) $1,789m (20%) $2,130m (28%) (unknown) (<2%) 
Source: ADB139 
 
General PSP 
In 1997 the Indonesian government, needing IMF credit due to the Asian Crisis, promised the IMF that 
“Steps will … be taken to promote competition by accelerating privatisation and expanding the role of the 
private sector in the provision of infrastructure.”140 Specifically, this included moving the overseeing of 
public enterprises to the Ministry of Finance from line ministries, and the establishment of a Privatisation 
Board and a framework for evaluating all government enterprises for closure, restructuring or privatisation. 
(It also included the removal of the 49 percent limit on foreign investment in companies listed on the stock 
exchange.) In January 1998 a government decree “…designed to facilitate private participation in the 
provision of public infrastructure…” made clear that the privatisation programme was not limited to strategic 
industries. The Government noted that “details of the procedures are being clarified with the World Bank. 
Needed changes to the decree and implementing regulations will be established by June 1998.”141 At the 
time, the Government was still under the control of the dictator Suharto – but the IMF and World Bank had 
no qualms about imposing a wide range of structural conditions that had little direct bearing on the issue at 
hand – currency stabilisation. The World Bank’s part in the bailout of Indonesia (two Policy Reform Support 
Loans of $1bn and $500m) also involved conditionalities, namely to privatise or prepare for privatisation 17 
state-owned enterprises; and to develop a master plan for state-owned enterprise reform. A November 2003 
evaluation of these loans by the World Bank concluded that “actual privatisation has been quite slow, 
however, because of widespread opposition and depressed market conditions”.142 
 
This involvement by the IMF and World Bank during the Asian Crisis, however, had been preceded by other 
efforts, laying the groundwork. This included two Technical Assistance Projects for Public and Private 
Provision of Infrastructure, worth $30m and $28m respectively. The second, running from 1995 to 2001, had 
as one of its four objectives “develop[ing] an updated strategy for public-private partnerships and suitable 
frameworks for private participation in provision of infrastructure services…” 143 It was followed up in 2003 
with a Private Provision of Infrastructure Technical Assistance Loan, worth $17.1m.144 The project 
documentation sees the need for “building public acceptance of private infrastructure”, among other things 
because “The public's perception of private infrastructure delivery has been colored by vigorous--but often 
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poorly-informed--debate on the failings of the power, toll-road, water supply, and telecoms deals concluded 
during the Suharto era.”  
 
Naturally, the World Bank’s vision, laid out in its 2001 Indonesia Private Sector Development Strategy, 
favours PSP:  
 
“In infrastructure, the Bank will continue to promote privatisation and private participation 
through its ongoing sector projects in telecommunications, power and transport. IFC is 
looking for opportunities to invest in the transport and water sectors. The Bank will seek 
means of promoting the private provision of social services in health and education through 
its sector projects and AAA advisory activities.”145 
 
As the Bank complains, however, it was only with the leverage provided by the 1997 crisis that it was able to 
get the Indonesian government to do its bidding:  
 
“During the mid-1990s, the Bank proposed the adoption of a cross-sectoral framework for 
private participation in infrastructure to help reduce risks and costs and continued to 
highlight the need for wide-ranging legal and regulatory reform. Advice was provided on the 
drafting of a cross-sectoral framework, but Government commitment was lacking and the 
envisaged regulation (Presidential Decree 7 of 1998) was only issued after the crisis had 
struck.” 146 
 
Even then, there are pesky political issues that make it difficult for the government to fulfil the World Bank’s 
wishes:  
 
“…the case for moving ahead with privatisation is compelling. But what is the best way 
forward - especially given opposition in Parliament? … privatizing such firms is never 
simple - they tend to have legal or contractual impediments, occupy a position of natural 
monopoly, or have substantial political support for keeping them in the public sector.” 147 
 
Electricity 
By 1999, Indonesia was promising the IMF that, with technical assistance funding from the World Bank and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), it intended to “restructure the power sector to improve efficiency and 
reduce the fiscal burden.” This programme included establishing a legal and regulatory framework for a 
competitive electricity market, and preparing for the privatisation of the state electricity company, PLN.148 
The relevant Electricity Law was finally passed in September 2002, aiming to “encourage competition and 
private investment in the sector… lead to the establishment of a regulatory body within a year to monitor the 
market and enforce the market rules… [and establish] a competitive market for generation … within 5 
years.”149 In support of these policies, the Bank and ADB agreed to focus on complementary areas of 
restructuring activities. ADB provided the Government with a programme loan of US$380 million and a 
technical assistance loan of US$20 million (with co-financing from Japan’s JBIC of US$400 million). The 
World Bank worked closely with ADB in “providing feedback on the initial drafts of the Electricity Law”,150 
and helped PLN to prepare the detailed design of its restructuring implementation plan.151 The latest (2003) 
CAS introduces an explicit conditionality: in order to reach the ‘high case’ with the largest amount of 
money, Indonesia will have to “increase private investment in power (by progress in establishing 
independent regulator in the electricity market, and continued tariff reforms).” 
 
Water 
In water, the World Bank in 1999 provided a $300m Water Resources Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL). 
Along with supporting water resources management reform, there is the specific aim of “amending water 
resources legislation to provide for regional autonomy and private sector involvement in water resources 
development.”(p4). One of the loan conditions was the passing of legislation to implement the new 
framework. After public opposition in autumn 2003 endangered the relevant legislation, the Bank threatened 
to withhold the final $150m tranche 152 - hardly indicative of ownership, nor are the Bank’s comments in the 
latest (2003) CAS on its use of selectivity:  
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“The failure to reform the 300 water utilities led the Bank to withdraw support for the sector for 
the past eight years, and limit support to technical assistance to “rescue” utilities post-crisis. 
Now a spirit of competition is emerging, and many local governments are recognizing the need 
to apply sound governance procedures to the water utilities they own.”153 
 
The loan also provides a broader illustration of the difficulties the World Bank has with the concept of 
ownership. Under the heading “Lessons Learned from Past Operations in the Sector”, the Bank notes that 
“Piecemeal reforms as part of loan conditionality are ineffective. Accordingly, [Government of Indonesia] 
ownership has been sought for an overall reform planned by all affected ministries and agencies with 
appropriate inputs from civil society derived by public consultation.” (p6) The word “sought” here is rather 
problematic – meaningful country ownership of a reform surely cannot be brought about by external agencies 
such as the World Bank seeking “appropriate inputs” from the locals.  
 
Health 
The World Bank has complained that “the Government has focused far less on creating an enabling 
environment in which all comers may flourish, than establishing and expanding in direct competition with 
private insurers, its own comprehensive system of health insurance.” 154 To try to counter this, “the Bank will 
seek means of promoting the private provision of social services in health … through its sector projects and 
AAA advisory activities.” More specifically,  
 
“Through its sectoral projects … the Bank will focus on creating an adequate regulatory 
environment and a level playing field for private provision of … health services. The aims 
will be to improve coverage and quality and reduce crowding out of the private sector by 
often inefficient subsidised state activities. Health [is a relatively new area] for IFC, where 
the Corporation is learning the best ways to support private sector efforts.” 155 
 
4.3.1. Indonesia: shocking behaviour in the electricity sector 
Until the 1997 crisis gave the International Financial Institutions the leverage they needed, private 
involvement in Indonesia’s electricity sector was limited to IPPs (Independent Power Producers). These had 
contracts with the state electricity company, PLN, guaranteeing that PLN take all their output, at prices 30% 
higher than the international market,156 and often dollar-denominated. According to the former PLN 
president, Djiteng Marsudi, “most of the private power plants rely on their connections with Suharto’s family 
and cronies,” saying, “only one of the 27 private power plant projects won a contract through a competitive 
bid.”157 A combination of inflated prices and (partly deliberate) over-investment158, driven more by cronyism 
than rational planning159 undermined PLN’s financial position, and with the 1997 currency crisis drove it to 
the edge of bankruptcy. This set the scene for the IFIs to demand privatisation in exchange for loans vital in 
the crisis – though not before some of the misguided IPPs got their money back with the aid of the World 
Bank. Most infamously, after Suharto’s overthrow, Enron apparently “insist[ed] that the Indonesian people 
[had] to honor the guarantees that Enron negotiated with the overthrown dictator.”160 And in March 2001, 
Enron received $15 million from the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a 
sum of money that came out of the pocket of the Indonesian government, for the cancellation of a power 
project.161 Apparently “MIGA officials made it clear that the government was correct to cancel the contracts 
given the subsequent economic downturn, but because of international law, Enron had to be compensated.” 
162 
 
The 1997 crisis was the chance for the IFIs (the World Bank and ADB in particular) to get their way, which 
previously they had struggled to do, as a result of which the ADB had “wisely refrained from further lending 
to PLN after 1995.”163 The World Bank continued to press for a decentralisation and PSP regulation 
component in its 1996 Power Transmission and Distribution Project, worth $373m.164 Moreover, as the ADB 
helpfully explains, “Both the World Bank and ADB had helped fund studies during 1996 and 1997 to 
examine strategic options for the power sector, and the recommendations of those studies—calling for a shift 
to a competitive market approach—led to the emergence of the multiple buyer-multiple seller market 
structure proposed for Java-Bali in the Government’s policy paper of 1998.” 165 A later Bank document 
clarified the “emergence” of this policy:  
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“In Indonesia, Bank staff were actively involved in drafting the power restructuring policy that was adopted by 
the post-Suharto government and that later paved the way for ADB’s program loan and formed the basis for 
the new electric power policy. The reform process, however, lost momentum with the departure of the 
Minister of Energy who had championed the restructuring policy, and with the political instability that 
characterised the Wahid presidency. The Bank’s influence in Indonesia’s power sector reforms soon 
diminished.”166 
 
Nonetheless, the various implicit and explicit conditionalities imposed by IMF, World Bank and AsDB, 
starting with a general privatisation programme in the midst of the crisis and then moving on to utilities 
(including electricity, water and gas), did have an effect. By 1999, Indonesia was promising the IMF that, 
with technical assistance funding from the World Bank and ADB, it intended to “restructure the power sector 
to improve efficiency and reduce the fiscal burden.”167 This programme included establishing a legal and 
regulatory framework for a competitive electricity market, and preparing for the privatisation of the state 
electricity company, PLN.168 The relevant Electricity Law was finally passed in September 2002, aiming to 
“encourage competition and private investment in the sector… lead to the establishment of a regulatory body 
within a year to monitor the market and enforce the market rules… [and establish] a competitive market for 
generation … within 5 years.”169 In support of these policies, the Bank and ADB agreed to focus on 
complementary areas of restructuring activities. ADB provided the Government with a programme loan of 
US$380 million and a technical assistance loan of US$20 million (with co-financing from Japan’s JBIC of 
US$400 million). The World Bank worked closely with ADB in “providing feedback on the initial drafts of 
the Electricity Law”, 170 and helped PLN to prepare the detailed design of its restructuring implementation 
plan. 171 Finally, the latest (2003) CAS introduces an explicit conditionality: in order to reach the ‘high case’ 
with the largest amount of money, Indonesia will have to “increase private investment in power (by progress 
in establishing independent regulator in the electricity market, and continued tariff reforms).”  
 
The fact that the IFIs’ conditionality was effective was due in no small part to the financial crisis at PLN, 
which in turn arose largely out of the IPPs. Despite this, PLN was basically sound – one of the largest 
integrated power utilities in the world, even after the onset of the 1997 crisis it continued to connect new 
consumers at the rate of over 1 million annually.172 
 
Even the IFIs involved later concluded that the whole eager process of taking advantage of Indonesia’s plight 
was perhaps not conducive to good policy, and that the liberalisation and privatisation programme wasn’t 
necessarily appropriate in the Indonesian context in any case. An internal ADB evaluation of its lending to 
Indonesia’s power sector concluded, comprehensively:  
 
“the Government’s Power Sector Restructuring Policy Paper of 1998 overlooked the absence in Indonesia of 
several of the enabling ingredients for the operation of sophisticated market mechanisms such as those 
foreseen in the policy paper. These features included an inadequate legal jurisdiction, weaknesses in the 
banking sector and in corporate governance practices, a lack of financial strength in the power sector, a lack 
of interest on the part of private investors to invest in Indonesia at the present time, and, so far, inadequate 
transparency and predictability in the power sector reform process. Sophisticated market structures 
introducing competition in the supply of bulk electricity are developed in other countries with very different 
circumstances from Indonesia and remain largely untested in the developing world. Since Indonesia 
undertook power sector reform against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis and the Government was in 
urgent need of quick-disbursing assistance, it was very likely that many important issues in terms of the 
technical, institutional, and human resource capabilities in Indonesia could not be adequately addressed 
during the design of the program loan.” 173 
 
 
4.4. Mozambique 
Since the ending of the 15-year civil war in 1992, and subsequent multi-party elections in 1994, 
Mozambique has received considerable amounts of external assistance, including HIPC debt relief. In 1995 
the Government published a National Water Policy174 which foresaw decentralisation, and a likely medium-
term withdrawal of government from the direct provision of water services. Two subsequent World Bank 
projects (National Water Development Projects I and II, worth $36m and $75m respectively, with the latter 
also attracting $30m from the African Development Bank, AfDB) included support for the development of 
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the relevant legal and regulatory framework, including provision for PSP. The first project included the 
evaluation of bids for the private sector management of five cities as a key performance indicator, as did the 
World Bank’s 1997 CAS175; and a similar commitment was made under the IMF’s ESAF176. The Bank also 
noted that whilst other donors had been involved in the water sector in Mozambique for many years, the 
Bank was providing “added value” by focusing its first intervention on PSP support.177 The framework was 
implemented in December 1998, and a private sector operator took over in September 1999. 
 
Another commitment Mozambique made to the IMF as part of its 1998 ESAF was the implementation of 
supporting regulations for the 1997 Electricity Law, which set a framework for possible competition in 
generation and distribution. Under the World Bank’s 2000 CAS, triggers for high-case lending included: 
“Significant progress toward demonopolisation of the energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors”, 
and a key performance indicator was “design and implement framework for expansion of electricity access 
including regionally differentiated tariffs and separation of generation, transmission, and distribution tariffs”. 
The World Bank provided technical assistance under a $40.3m Energy Reform project178, and in addition it 
was noted that “IFC [will provide] Financing for private providers [and] Advisory assistance on 
privatisation”. Under the 2003 CAS, an intermediate indicator for electricity supply efficiency improvement 
was “Private partner brought into [state electricity company] EdM”, and for water “Urban water tariff raised 
to permit cost recovery and network extension”.179 For both water and energy, “other donors” listed in the 
2000 CAS includes USAID and AfDB, but not the UK.180 
 
In the context of public sector reform, the Bank remarks that “Since much of the PRSC [Poverty Reduction 
Support Credit, a Bank loan program] agenda grows out of Bank analytical work, the Bank is better 
positioned to support this agenda than other donors.” 181 In the context of upcoming elections (November 
2003 and late 2004), the Bank identifies the risk that “the new Government … will initiate an inappropriate 
shift in policy direction…” The Bank will however:  
 
 “try to mitigate [the risks] by actively engaging the key political parties prior to elections on the 
main development challenges facing Mozambique; preparing a CAS Progress Report (late 
FY05) that will be discussed with the Government (and the Board); and preparing a CEM 
[Country Economic Memorandum] in FY06 on the challenge of sustainable broad-based 
growth.” 182 
 
These are not the Bank’s only problems, as sometimes there are delays in the Government doing what 
the Bank wants: “Preparation of the Public Sector Reform and Decentralised Planning projects was 
delayed to allow sufficient time to build Government ownership of the proposed reforms…”183 
In health, the World Bank’s 2000 CAS comments that ‘…IFC will support the expansion of private medical 
services…’, and that IFC already has “investments in private medical services”. 
 
4.4.1. Mozambique: IMF conditions in water sector 
Mozambique is very poor, and in 1999 became the third country in the world to obtain debt relief under the 
HIPC initiative. Expanding and improving water supply and sanitation has been an important policy issue.  
As part of a long programme of restructuring, the government adopted a water policy in 1995 which stated 
that the “government [is] likely to withdraw from direct implementation of services”, and rely on the private 
sector. 184 
 
But it remained subject to continuing and repeated conditionalities by the IFIs and donors.  Reform of the 
water laws was a requirement of the World Bank’s country assistance strategy (CAS) in 2000; in 2001 the 
country’s PRSP 185 stated that “key measures include: …encouraging the participation of the private sector in 
the provision of these services; updat[ing] the legislative framework and strengthen[ing] the strategy for 
involving the private sector in the management of water supply and sanitation in urban areas.” 186 ; and 
extensive privatisation was required as a condition for the WB/IMF US$3.7 billion debt relief under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.187 Water and privatisation also feature in the DFID and 
the EC aid programme, with DFID cooperating with the EC and other donors, operating in a co-ordinated 
fashion: in DFID’s words: “the donors remain a powerful group in Mozambique”.  DFID treats privatisation 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
27/02/2004  Page 26 of 40  
  
in general as a measure of success:  “Mozambique has made some progress in some areas of Public Service 
Reform, for example through the privatisation process…” 188 
 
Following this policy in the cities, in order to “improve the quality, reliability and sustainability of urban 
water services” (CAS, para 45), the government awarded a private concession contract in 1999 covering the 
major cities of Mozambique. The consortium, Aguas de Mocambique, was led by Saur International [a 
French multinational] with 38.5 per cent of the capital, IPE-Aguas do Portugal with 31.5 per cent of the 
capital, and Mazi-Mozambique with 30 per cent. Mazi-Mozambique consists of a Mozambican NGO and 
three other private Mozambican companies. The concession agreement was for five years in the cities of 
Beira, Dondo, Quelimane, Nampula and Pemba, and for 15 years' management of water services in Maputo 
and Matola.189 
 
But the company failed to achieve its profit targets. Saur, which held 38.5 per cent of the shares, wanted to 
declare Aguas de Mocambique bankrupt at the end of 2001, which would have had the effect of reducing the 
liabilities of the multinational parent company. In effect, Saur was unwilling for its shareholders to carry any 
of the extra liability that Mozambique’s water services had to face after the floods. The other shareholders - 
Aguas de Portugal and the Mozambican companies – bought the shares from Saur, and renegotiating the 
contract and agreeing a new investment programme.190  
 
One of the performance indicators in the CAS is increasing access to safe water in major cities from 44% in 
1998 to 50% by 2004. The 2003 WB appraisal on public expenditure policy in Mozambique,191 however, 
notes that “it is uncertain whether the PARPA [Mozambique’s PRSP] targets of increasing direct access to 
urban water supply from the 2001 level of 44 to 50 percent… can be met by 2005”,192 despite the fact that the 
water supply in all the cities was privatised in 1999 in accordance with recommendations. It explains this by 
gentle reference to problems with the contract: “Since then, with the setback of the floods of 2000, 
difficulties were experienced with the contract, necessitating a change of operators, explaining why little 
progress has been made to date.”193   
 
However, no suggestion is made that the policy of privatisation should be reviewed: instead, there is an 
enthusiastic discussion of the feasibility of full cost recovery from users in the cities, concluding that even an 
increase of 131 % seems to be possible, even though this would cost on average over 5.5% of the minimum 
wage; because 59% of people are already paying more than 4% of two minimum wages for water, and so this 
must be “socially acceptable”. 194 
 
The policy of private sector participation in water also had a damaging effect on rural water development 
schemes. Under a DFID project, Niassa province was required to use private firms to develop its water 
supply, but the province was so poor that there was no viable private sector: just 15 struggling construction 
contractors and one state-owned works company, while the water policy prohibited the direct employment by 
donors of local labour. The result was poor quality work, lack of input and control by communities, with 
supply points built near water sources for the convenience of contractors rather than near villages for the 
convenience of communities.195 
 
The CAS explains that the WB “will support several large high-risk developments, because they havea 
demonstrative effect (such as the second National Water Development project, which supports private-sector 
urban water supply and will receive a $15 million supplement)”, which is needed to pay the “costs incurred 
by the need to rebid the concessions following the withdrawal of the original operator.”196 
 
 
4.5. South Africa 
DFID notes South Africa’s public sector achievements: “Government has … made substantial improvements 
in the delivery of basic services to previously disadvantaged areas. Between 1994 and 2001, some 7 million 
people were provided with access to water services, [and] 3.5 million new electricity grid connections were 
made…”197 
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Electricity 
The South African electricity utility Eskom is a state-owned company serving the whole country. It is the 
most powerful electricity company in Africa, and profitable. Eskom has been pursuing an expansionary 
policy and is active in other African countries, including Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, the Gambia 
and Nigeria, via its wholly owned subsidiary, Eskom Enterprises. As apartheid ended, Eskom played a key 
role in implementing a massive programme of rural electrification, following clear developmental objectives:  
 
“At the end of 1999, Eskom had made 2,135,661 new connections since the start of the 
electrification programme in 1991. This target has been achieved a year ahead of schedule and 
a further three year target of 600,000 has been set. Prior to 1994, only 12% of our rural 
population had access to electricity compared to current levels of 42% as at end 1999. To date, 
1,500 schools have been electrified with photovoltaic systems.” 198 
 
Eskom’s role in this programme was driven by a clear set of social and development objectives, that 
extended even beyond the challenge of rural electrification itself to include development of its own 
workforce, public health programmes, and local enterprise development. 
 
However the government of South Africa has passed legislation which provides for the unbundling and 
possible future privatisation of parts of Eskom. This has been met with strong opposition from many groups, 
including the trade unions. In August 2000, Public Enterprises Minister, Jeff Radebe, announced plans to 
divide Eskom into corporate units comprising transmission, generation and distribution, while its power units 
will be broken up into a number of separate units. Initially, different generating companies will be formed to 
promote internal competition, followed by the introduction of private sector participation via a strategic 
equity partner or a listing. Longer-term, the Government plans to liberalise generation, but Eskom at present 
is producing a surplus of power.199 
 
Water 
Research from South Africa is critical of privatised operations, stating that companies like Water and 
Sanitation South Africa (WSSA, a Lyonnaise des Eaux/Group Five joint venture) promised to "render an 
affordable, cost effective and optimised service, implement effective consumer management" and ensure that 
customers are "willing and able to pay for services, while maximising revenue collection." Yet in practice, in 
the Stutterheim pilot, water services were instead characterised by WSSA's failure to serve any of the 80 of 
the region's township residents (classic cherry-picking), mass cut-offs of water by the municipalities of 
township residents who could not afford payments, and the cooption of the main civic leader into WSSA's 
employ, thus effectively rendering silent any community protest.200  
 
The WSSA concession in Queenstown has also been criticised for extracting too great a profit from the 
operation. According to SAMWU, “WSSA, the local subsidiary of French water multinational, Suez-
Lyonnaise, is allegedly paid over R1 million per month by council to supply the town's water. Yet municipal 
workers involved in meter reading say the company is grossly overcharging for its services. Municipal 
workers are reading the meters and collecting payments from the community to the value of about R250,000 
per month. It seems that the R750,000 extra is simply a fee being used to boost the profits of WSSA.”201 
 
In Nelspruit, South Africa, the private concessionaire, Biwater/Nuon, is being given a water treatment 
plant202 which was funded by state aid from Portugal, and built and operated by the South African 
government.203 
The city of Johannesburg has provided another example of restructuring services through privatisation 
without public debate or consultation. A major city restructuring plan, known as “Igoli 2002”, was drawn up 
by council managers and leaders in collaboration with international consultancy firms, with proposals for the 
commercialisation and privatisation of many services, including water and energy, without any advance 
public consultation or debate.  The plan is now the subject of dispute and controversy. 204  
 
4.5.1. South Africa: USAID inserts a water privatisation filter 
The South African government has been ambivalent about the question of water privatisation since the mid-
1990s. There has been strong pressure from within South Africa for the Government to retain a commitment 
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to public sector provision of water and sanitation, but it has also been attracted by the possibility of 
investment through private sector involvement.  
 
Advice and support for the private sector option in municipal services is provided through the Municipal 
Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU), which is wholly owned by the government of South Africa. The 
MIIU’s mission statement makes its role clear: “To encourage and optimise private sector investment in local 
authority services, on a basis that is sustainable for both local authorities and at a national level; to assist the 
development of an established market containing informed local authority clients, private sector advisers, 
and private sector investors and service providers.” 205 
 
The MIIU provides an important role as a gateway to the funds of the state-owned Development Bank of 
Southern Africa (DBSA).  
 
MIIU has come to operate as a representative of private interests. The 2002 report shows MIIU pressurising 
the South African government to alter legislation to favour the interests of the private sector:  “The Unit 
continues to work on statutory impediments to accessing private sector finance for water and sanitation 
concessions in the Water Services Act and the Municipal Systems Act. Both acts still contain provisions 
allowing ministers to regulate MSP arrangements in ways that are sometimes perceived as threats to project 
financial viability by private service providers and financiers. The Systems Act provision continues to 
authorise the Minister of Provincial and Local Government to limit municipal tariff increases, which would 
affect any concession (or municipal loan) relying on tariff revenues.” 
 
The MIIU was effectively created by, and is still supported by, USAID, in order to promote privatisation of 
water, by offering “long- and short-term technical assistance to the MIIU to support the creation of a 
sustainable framework for private infrastructure investment in the Republic of South Africa”206. USAID 
helped to capitalise the Unit's project grant fund when it was established in 1998,207 and has provided 
consultancy staff ever since. The consultants – Padco and RTI – describe how they “created the MIIU as a 
non-profit company, with its own CEO and Board of Directors, and began laying a foundation for a mature 
financial market that will facilitate the flow of private capital into municipal infrastructure projects.”208   
 
USAID funded overseas trips to help convince municipal officials of the virtues of privatisation, through a 
study tour organised by Padco “for 12 South African officials to observe the workings of public-private 
partnerships — primarily in water utilities — in South America and Australia.” 209 USAID also provided 
funding for counter-propaganda attacking critics of privatisation, because MIIU found that municipalities 
were using these critiques as reasons for not embracing water privatisation.210   
  
The MIIU 2003 report acknowledges continuing support from USAID: “USAID continues to provide 
valuable financial support, extended until 2005, to enable MIIU to benefit from the expertise of its expatriate 
advisors.”211 It received further assistance from USAID in 2003 to help overcome municipalities’ reluctance 
to embrace water privatisation, which MIIU refers to as ‘far from acceptable’: “MIIU has seen a distinct 
tailing off of interest in the water sector for long-term public-private partnerships…Unfortunately, this has 
had the simultaneous impact of dampening long-term interest in the water sector. While this is 
understandable, it is far from acceptable if we wish to ensure the growth of service delivery in the water 
sector in the near term. In February 2003, the Board approved a pilot project, in terms of which MIIU will, in 
conjunction with USAID, investigate and if possible pilot a credit enhancement scheme for long-term 
finance for municipalities in the water sector.”212 
 
All the USAID funding for MIIU has been dedicated to promoting a single policy option of privatisation – it 
has not been available for any other purpose. The funding has been specifically targeted at South African 
municipalities who are reluctant to embrace privatisation. Although the central government of South Africa 
may have been content for the MIIU to operate in this way, it has continually had USAID personnel and 
funding available for promoting internally controversial policies. 
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4.6. Sri Lanka 
Government policy since 1992 has included policies supporting private sector participation in infrastructure. 
The initial policy initiative was “strongly supported” by a $10m technical assistance programme from 
USAID. In 1996 the World Bank funded a $77m Private Sector Infrastructure Development Project, not least 
because at the time, “despite the shift in government policy in favor of private participation, translation into 
real transactions has been a difficult and contentious process.” 213 The Bank remarks that:  
 
“a major objective of the World Bank Group is to influence and accelerate the transitional process 
from public dominated infrastructure to private operation and ownership. The Bank Group's 
proactive role in Sri Lanka is seen as an innovative one for the promotion of private sector 
opportunities, given the main emphasis on public sector lending for infrastructure by the other 
major donors – [Japan’s] Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and ADB.” 214 
 
This objective was supported by conditionalities contained in the 1996 and 2003 Country Assistance 
Strategies. The 1996 CAS required “continued privatisation… [including] progress on BOO/BOT schemes” 
for the base-case scenario to be met, with the 2003 CAS’s ‘CAS Completion Report’ noting some BOO 
private power schemes and the passing (in 2002) of the Electricity Law which foresees unbundling of the 
CEB. The 2003 CAS builds on this by requiring for the high-case scenario “accelerated implementation of 
the economic reform program, especially with regards to: [item 1 of 3] … Securing private participation in 
infrastructure…”215 In case there is any doubt, the Bank helpfully makes clear what is going on: 
 
“In the base case, IDA would not finance infrastructure. The two largest external providers of 
financing—the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and ADB—are willing to 
continue to finance the key programs in roads, energy and water supply. In the spirit of 
selectivity, IDA will participate only with respect to supporting key reforms and potentially 
private participation in infrastructure. If the Government does proceed with advanced reforms in 
areas such as urban water, railways, roads financing and ports, and succeeds in attracting 
private participation, in a high case scenario—in which these reforms are explicit triggers—IDA 
would consider participating through lending and/or guarantees.”216 
 
Additionally, the IFC will support PSP in infrastructure, “especially in power, ports, water, and 
telecommunications.” So far in Sri Lanka it has invested in a private power generation project, 217 and a 
private hospital project.218 The World Bank’s 2003 CAS also notes thatthe “IFC has already invested in 
a private hospital in Colombo and would continue to look for opportunities to support the private 
provision of health services.” The DFID-owned CDC, which fulfils a similar role to the IFC, has 
investments in power in Sri Lanka, including minority stakes in two 50MW IPPs (Ace Power, Asia 
Power), acquired in 2001. 
 
The World Bank’s $15m Economic Reform Technical Assistance Project in 2002 listed among its 
performance indicators:  
 
“the un-bundling of Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) with the establishment of separate 
generation, distribution, transmission and bulk power companies with a transparent framework 
for procuring future power generation capacity from the private sector, … [and] the signing of 
lease agreements for private sector participation in urban water supply and sanitation in 
selected secondary towns and significant progress towards concessioning greater Colombo 
water and sewerage services.” 219 
 
The project included technical assistance for two pilot PSPs in water, and for “preparatory work” on a 
possible PSP in Greater Colombo. A previous project which included a BOT wastewater component 
failed “owing to lack of private sector interest,” in part because of uncertainties over security and 
environmental regulation.220 The World Bank’s 1996 Private Sector Infrastructure Project had already 
studied the potential for PSP in the two pilot areas, and in 2002 the Bank and the Government agreed 
a timetable for privatisation there.221 
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The ADB follows the same agenda. It has consistently supported privatisation since the mid-1980s, both in 
Sri Lanka and elsewhere, in particular through the use of Technical Assistant advisory studies attached to 
loans, which “helped increase awareness of the potential for privatisation.”222 An internal 2001 ADB 
evaluation found that: 
 
 “Ownership of ADTAs [advisory technical assistance projects] was found to be limited or 
intermittent in most cases…In Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Electricity Board does not own the 
implementation process since the ADTAs are seen largely as donor-driven initiatives… [with] a 
few counterpart staff [describing] ADTAsas a ‘small price to pay’ for the project loans.” 223 
 
Curiously, the evaluation saw one of the four key issues as the need to “generat[e] ownership of the 
reform process and ADTAs.”224 Once again, the fundamental question arises, as it has elsewhere, of 
whether ownership for an objective predetermined by an external actor can simply be “generated”, or 
whether the meaning of ‘ownership’ would encompass the setting of those objectives themselves. 
 
In the power sector, it is the ADB that has been the lead donor in driving and supporting restructuring 
– the IMF notes that “the PRGF does not include any conditionality on the restructuring of the state-
owned Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB), given that the AsDB is taking the lead in this area.”225 The 
ADB has provided technical assistance for the unbundling of the CEB and the necessary regulatory 
framework, and in 2002 a $60m Power Sector Development Program Loan to support the 
restructuring. It has also been active in the water sector, in 2002 providing technical assistance for 
regulatory reform and PSP design226, and in 2003 a $60.3m Secondary Towns and Rural Community-
Based Water Supply and Sanitation Project Loan. This had as one of its three goals “to continue 
supporting the sector reforms identified in previous interventions, including achievement of full cost 
recovery, independent regulation of the water sector, and increase in the participation of the private 
sector.” 227 
 
Commenting on these various reforms, the IMF in 2003 noted approvingly that “the main tenet of the PRSP 
is to ‘regain Sri Lanka’ by accelerating growth and reducing poverty through private-sector led development. 
This marks a clear departure from the previous unsustainable policies of ‘redistribution and transfers’ to 
alleviate poverty.” 228 The odd phrase ‘regain Sri Lanka’ seems to imply the private sector ‘taking back’ the 
country from the public sector as if from a colonial power. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: why it matters 
An increasing proportion of aid, certainly in water and energy, is only available in support of options 
involving the private sector. Much of this is channelled through coordinated policy initiatives, with common 
policy conditionalities, with the Poverty Reduction SP and CAS playing a central role.  Is there any reason 
for concern with this?  Those involved would argue that coordination is much better than many disparate 
donor decisions, and that the support for the private sector reflects the importance of massive injections of 
Foreign Direct Investment to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goals. The process is thus 
developmentally beneficial, as well as more efficient. 
 
There are three key reasons for being very concerned with these developments, however. 
 
5.1. Empirical issues, not faith 
The first is that the consequences of using the private sector in this way are not always beneficial. There are 
now many well-known cases in which the private sector’s presence has proved both expensive and 
unreliable. Sometimes, it works badly.229 The limitations of the private sector in water and energy are now 
recognised even by the World Bank, which acknowledges in its 2003 infrastructure review that: “the recent 
decreases in private sector interest in infrastructure show that reliance on the private sector alone will not be 
sufficient to guarantee a scaling-up of infrastructure service provision.” 230  
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This means that in any given case an assessment should always be made as to whether the use of the private 
sector, especially the international private sector, is the best option, or whether development through public 
sector mechanisms, as in most historical precedents, is the best way forward. 231  Any aid mechanism which 
presumes, or requires, that the decision must come down in favour of the private sector, is distorting that 
choice with potentially damaging effects. 
 
5.2. Democratic decisions and independent states 
The second reason is that governments, even of the poorest countries, should be enabled to decide their own 
policies, and the organisation of public services is a central issue for the decision-making of an independent 
state. If an increasing proportion of aid to these sectors depends on a certain form of provision, then it 
increasingly pre-empts the ability of countries to make their own decisions. 
 
Again, this is the more important because the policies are highly contentious, as is acknowledged by many 
observers.  At the World Bank’s energy week in February 2003 a speaker from the global consulting firm 
Deloittes noted: “Growing political opposition to privatisation in emerging markets due to widespread 
perception that it does not serve the interests of the population at large,” which they attributed to a number of 
features of privatisation: 
 
 “Pressures to increase tariffs and cut off non-payers; loss of jobs of vocal union members that 
will be hard to retrain for the new economy; the perception that only special interests are served 
- privatisation is seen as serving oligarchic domestic and foreign interests that profit at the 
expense of the country.”232 
 
Countries, either through their governments or civil society, do not necessarily accept the conditionalities 
quietly – the lengthy and broad-based campaign on health in El Salvador is a good example of this. Another 
example is the collective response of developing country governments, as seen in the WTO discussions in 
Cancun, for example. These responses are encouraging indications of democratic political activity, though 
the political relations are globalised as well – internal processes responding to global policies. The structure 
of policy-linked, globalised aid is in danger of becoming a global political programme. 
5.3. Accountability and transparency 
The third reason is one of transparency and accountability of donor organisations.  An increasing proportion 
of aid, and decision-making on its allocation, is being channelled through agencies which are not themselves 
directly accountable through parliamentary or other democratic, public mechanisms.  There is little 
discussion or appreciation of the significant activity of DFID in support of restrictive mechanisms promoting 
privatisation in these sectors. In the UK at least this reflects national government policies favouring 
privatisation in public services – although this remains the subject of a domestic political debate – but in 
other countries the support for pro-private conditionalities is more bizarre: for example, the USA, Norway, 
Sweden and the Netherlands all retain water within their own public sector, yet are supporting programmes 
promoting privatisation of other people’s water.  It is not clear that these conditional aid policies would have 
public support in the donor countries either. 
5.4. Some questions 
The workings of these conditionalities should be the subject of public reviews in both donor and recipient 
countries. There is a series of questions to be addressed:  
 
• Should the structure of public services in general ever be subject to conditionalities, direct or 
indirect? Should this area of public policy always be decided entirely by national democratic 
mechanisms? 
• Should the structure of any particular service, such as water or energy, ever be subject to universal 
policy guidelines rather than be subject to a national level evaluation of all options? 
• Are the BWIs or donors in danger of using collective programmes as a more remote and less 
accountable forum in which to develop controversial policies that do not command public support 
either in donor countries or recipient countries? 
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In effect, these questions are already being addressed by political opposition movements in developing 
countries. The question is whether donors and development banks are capable of being subjected to a public 
review on these issues.  
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